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HIDING BEHIND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME
COURT AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN CLEVELAND
BOARD OF EDUCATION V. LOUDERMILL
by
JENNIFER JAFF*
This term, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to affirm the approach
of the plurality in Arnett v. Kennedy' in Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill.2 In Arnett, Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion articulated the
rule that statutorily-created entitlements can be limited by and conditioned
upon the procedural rules that accompany those entitlements.'
This article argues that the Supreme Court should have adopted Justice
Rehnquist's approach in Arnett because it articulates a clear rule of law. Such
clarity would have two effects. First, holders of entitlements would know what
procedures they would be afforded at the time the entitlement was granted
thereby allowing them to fully appreciate the nature and contours of that en-
titlement.4 Second, and more significantly, a clearly articulated rule would
enable the public to appreciate the political nature of the judicial process. If the
Court revealed itself as a political body to the public, people could then react
appropriately by attempting to change the judicial system in America. Because
adopting Justice Rehnquist's approach would have exposed the political nature
of the Supreme Court and thereby encouraged political action aimed at chang-
ing the nature of the judicial process, the Court declined to do so, at least in
terms as stark as those used by Justice Rehnquist.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Loudermill, a discharged public employee brought an action for
damages and declaratory relief against his municipal employers challenging his
dismissal as a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court held that public employees are entitled to a hearing prior to the ter-
mination of their employment.'
James Loudermill was employed by a private firm that supplied security
*Instructor, University of Miami Law School. The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Mark
Tushnet, Jonathan Chase, Gil Kujovich, and Debbie Curtis.
-416 U.S. 134 (1974).
253 U.S.L.W. 4306 (U.S. March 19, 1985).
'Arnett, 416 U.S. at 152.
40n its face, the Court's opinion in Loudermill appears to create a clear rule of law, however, this appearance
does not reflect the reality of how the Court's decision will be applied. See infra notes 107-109 and accom-
panying text.
'Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education, 721 F.2d 550, 552 (6th Cir. 1983).
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guards to the Cleveland Board of Education.6 Upon that firm's bankruptcy, the
Cleveland Board of Education hired some of the firm's employees including
Loudermill. 7 The employment application included the following question:
"Have you ever been convicted of a crime (felony)?" to which respondent
Loudermill replied, "No."8 Additionally, respondent signed his name after a
paragraph at the end of the application that stated, in effect, that the applicant
certified the veracity of his responses and acknowledged that false statements
would result in dismissal.'
Loudermill was hired by the Board on September 25, 1979.10 He was clas-
sified as a civil service employee and, therefore, pursuant to statute he could
only be discharged for cause." In addition, the applicable statute provided for
an appeal from any order of discharge within 30 days of dismissal. 2 After one
year, Loudermill was transferred to a newly-created department. 3 A routine
review of his records revealed that he had been convicted of a felony in 1968."
The Board's Business Manager informed Loudermill, by a letter dated Novem-
ber 3, 1980, that he was being discharged. 5 The reason given was Loudermill's
alleged dishonesty in completing the employment application. 6 Loudermill
contended that, if he had been provided an opportunity to explain before the
Board took action regarding his employment, he could have shown that he
61d.
'Id.
Vd.
'd.
told.
"OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 124.34 (Page 1984), which in relevant part provides:
The tenure of every officer or employee in the classified service of the state and the counties...
holding a position under this chapter of the Revised Code, shall be during good behavior and efficient
service and no such officer or employee shall be reduced in pay or position, suspended, or removed,
except as provided in section 124.32 of the Revised Code, and for incompetency, inefficiency,
dishonesty.., or any other failure of good behavior, or any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or
nonfeasance in office....
In any case of reduction, suspension of more than three working days, or removal, the appointing
authority shall furnish such employee with a copy of the order of reduction, suspension, or removal,
which order shall state the reasons therefor. Such order shall be filed with the director of ad-
ministrative services and state personnel board of review, or the commission, as may be appropriate.
Within ten days following the filing of such order, the employer may file an appeal, in writing, with
the state personnel board of review or the commission. In the event such an appeal is filed, the board
or commission shall forthwith notify the appointing authority and shall hear, or appoint a trial board
to hear, such appeal within thirty days from and after its filing with the board or commission, and it
'nay affirm, disaffirm, or modify the judgment of the appointing authority.
In cases of removal or reduction in pay for disciplinary reasons, either the appointing authority or
the officers or employee may appeal from the decision of the state personnel board of review or the
commission to the court of common pleas of the county in which the employee resides in accordance
with the procedure provided by section 119.12 of the Revised Code ....
121d.
"1721 F.2d at 553.
14/d.
"I d.
161d.
[Vol. 18:4
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mistakenly believed that the crime of which he was convicted was only a mis-
demeanor.'7
In January 1981, approximately two months after Loudermill's discharge,
the Cleveland Civil Service Commission held a hearing on his contentions. 8
The referee assigned to the case recommended that Loudermill be reinstated;
however, the Civil Service Commission rejected that recommendation and af-
firmed Loudermill's discharge on July 20, 198 1. 1 In October 1981, Loudermill
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking: monetary damages, a
declaration that Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.34 is constitutionally invalid for
failure to provide for a pre-termination hearing, and an injunction ordering
reinstatement and back pay."
The district court, in a brief unpublished opinion, held that Loudermill's
due process rights had not been violated." The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed." That court recognized that civil service employees have an
interest in continuing employment which cannot be discontinued unless the re-
quirements of due process are met. 3 The court relied on Justice Powell's con-
curring opinion in Arnett. 14 In Arnett, Justice Powell asserted that once a state
creates an entitlement, it may not deprive someone of such an entitlement
without regard to procedural safeguards.'
The court went on to discuss and apply the balancing test articulated by
the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge. 16 Under the Mathews test, the fac-
tors balanced are: the importance of the private interest affected, the risk of er-
ror created by use of the procedure in question, and the strength of the govern-
mental interest involved.27 The court concluded that the individual interest in-
volved coupled with the risk of error created by the procedure embodied in
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.34 outweighed the governmental interest in ad-
ministrative convenience. 8 Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the
171d
.
"Id.
191d.
2DId.
211ld.
"Id. at 563.
131d. at 559.
"Id. at 560.
'Arnett, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (Powell, J., concurring).
-424 U.S. 319 (1976).
"Id. at 333-35.
"721 F.2d at 562. Judge Wellford dissented from the majority's holding regarding Loudermill's due process
claims. 1d. at 565 (Wellford, J., dissenting). By drawing an analogy to Arnett, Judge Wellford reasoned that
Loudermill's property right was conditioned by the Ohio statute's procedural limitations from its inception.
Id. In addition, he stressed the importance of the Ohio Supreme Court's determination that the statute's pro-
cedures comported with the requirements of due process. Id. (citing Parfitt v. Columbus Correctional Facili-
ty, 62 Ohio St. 2d 434, 406 N.E.2d 528 (1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061). Finally, Judge Wellford stated
Spring, 19851
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Board's failure to provide Loudermill with a pre-termination hearing violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.29
On March 19, 1985, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court
of appeals by an eight-to-one majority." The Court, in an opinion written by
Justice White, rejected the reasoning of the plurality in Arnett stating that
"the categories of substance and procedure are distinct."'" All nine Justices
found that Loudermill had a property right in continued public employment,
and so the requirements of due process applied. 2 Thus, Loudermill was entitled
to "some kind of hearing.""
The Court went on to apply the Mathews criteria ' to the facts in Louder-
mill. 15 The Court reasoned that the individual interest in continued public
employment was extremely significant,36 as evidenced by the Court's "fre-
quent[ ] recogniftion] [of] the severity of depriving a person of the means of
livelihood."37 Secondly, because "the only meaningful opportunity to invoke
the discretion of the decision-maker is likely to be before the termination takes
effect,"38 the risk of erroneous deprivations would be greatly reduced by allow-
ing a pre-termination hearing." Finally "[tihe governmental interest in im-
mediate termination does not outweigh these interests"' , because "affording
the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination would impose
neither a significant administrative burden nor intolerable delays."4'
However, the Court went on to say that "the pretermination 'hearing,'
though necessary, need not be elaborate.""2 It need only be an "initial check
against mistaken decisions.4 3 Indeed, all that is constitutionally required are
"notice and an opportunity to respond." The Court found it significant that
that due process requires a "reliable pretermination finding," Id. at 566 citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 445 U.S. 422, 436 (1982), and that there was such a finding in this case. Id.
2721 F.2d at 563. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on May 21, 1984. 104 S. Ct.
2384 (1984).
'Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 53 U.S.L.W. 4306 (U.S. March 19, 1985).
3 Id. at 4308.
121d. at 4311 (Marshall, J., concurring); Id. at 4313 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Id. at 4314
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 4308 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1974)).
'See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
I'Loudermill, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4308-09.
36Id.
37Id.
Nld. at 4309.
39Id.
40d.
41Id.
421d.
431d.
"Id.
[Vol. 18:4
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the Ohio statute provides for a "full post-termination hearing" that would sup-
plement any pre-termination procedures."5
Thus, because a clear majority of the Court held that Loudermill was en-
titled to "some kind of hearing" prior to his discharge from public employment,
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. 6
Justice Marshall concurred in a separate opinion. 7 He argued that the ex-
treme weight of the individual's interest in continued public employment man-
dated that the pre-termination procedure consist of a trial-type hearing." He
reasoned that a post-deprivation hearing may not "make the employee[ I whole
again,""9 and, thus, a less than rigorous pre-termination hearing could still
leave open the possibility of "irreparable injury." 0
Justice Rehnquist, again the "lone dissenter,"'" reiterated the reasoning
that he advanced in Arnett." Justice Rehnquist stated that "the substantive
right may [not] be viewed wholly apart from the procedure provided for its en-
forcement."53 Justice Rehnquist proceeded to discuss the contours of the Ohio
statute concluding that the Ohio Legislature had provided public employees
with a "limited form of tenure during good behavior, and prescribed the pro-
cedure by which that procedure may be terminated [ I in one legislative
breath."'" Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority had incorrectly defined
the state-created property right in this case," and that a clearer rule is needed
in the area of due process. 6
However, despite Justice Rehnquist's reservations and the Arnett plurali-
4'1d. at 4309. Finally, Justice White stated that the court of appeals was correct in dismissing Loudermill's
separate contention that the administrative delays that he suffered were impermissible. Id. at 4309-10. The
Court found that Loudermill's complaint had not sufficiently alleged this separate cause of action. Id.
4Id. at 43 10.
471d. (Marshall, J., concurring in Part II and concurring in the judgment).
4 1d.
4
'9d.
"Id. Justice Brennan concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 4311 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Brennan's disagreement with the majority centered on its ruling regarding the ad-
ministrative delay. Id. at 4311-13. Justice Brennan would have remanded the case to the district court
because the facts alleged in Loudermill's complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, were in-
sufficient on which to base an "informed judgment." Id. at 4312. Justice Brennan also mentioned that, in
cases unlike Loudermill's in which factual disputes are involved, a more rigorous pretermination procedure
might be required. Id. at 4311. However, he reasoned that the majority's opinion did not "foreclose the views
expressed [by him) or by Justice Marshall .... with respect to discharges based on disputed evidence or
testimony." Id.
"Justice Rehnquist's clerks attributed that title to him a few years ago. See, New York Times, Magazine Sec-
tion, March 3, 1985.
" Ioudermill, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4313-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 4313 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152 (1974)).
'Loudermill, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4313.
"Id. at 4314.
%Id.
Spring, 1985]
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ty, a majority of the Court decided to affirm the court of appeals in Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill.
II. ANALYSIS OF PRECEDENT
The question whether public employees have a constitutional right to a
pre-termination hearing has, in the past, been bifurcated into two issues: first,
whether those employees have a legitimate property interest; and second, what
procedures are required once such an interest has been found. The first ques-
tion, whether public employment creates an entitlement, has been decided con-
clusively in the affirmative." Board of Regents v. Roth established the rule
that a public employee has a property right in continued employment when his
employment contract provides that he can be discharged only for "sufficient
cause."
58
Though the rule of Roth settled the issue of when an entitlement is
created, the language of Roth sparked a new controversy over the nature of
the procedures required to satisfy due process. The Court stated that,
"[piroperty interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather,
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law....
The Arnett v. Kennedy plurality expanded on that language, and held that
substantial entitlements created by state or federal law could be conditioned on
or limited by the procedures enumerated in that law.'e
Thus, before this term's decision, the controversy was centered on
whether the Arnett plurality properly determined the law on this issue, or
whether due process requires something more than mere compliance with
state-defined procedures. If the latter was the case, the inquiry would tradi-
tionally have proceeded to the question of what procedures are constitutional-
ly required. In the past, this question would have been decided by applying the
'Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). But see, Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (police officer did not have a property interest in continued employment). It
was, of course, possible that the Court would have reconsidered its position in Roth in light of Bishop.
Without citing any authority, the Bishop court seemed to collapse the issue of the existence of a property
right into the issue of what process is due when such a right has been found. 426 U.S. at 345-47. This may, in
fact, represent an affirmation of the general sentiment behind the Amett plurality's opinion in that the
Bishop court seems to be saying that the right that is created by statute is the right as conditioned by pro-
cedural rules. See S.G. BREYER AND R.B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 647(1979). The arguments in favor of affirming the plurality's opinion in Arnett could be applied equally as well
to an argument in favor of affirming Bishop.
In addition, one could argue that such reliance on Bishop would be misplaced. One could read Bishop
more narrowly, as holding only that when two lower federal courts that know local law interpret a local
statute, that interpretation is to be deferred to. According to this reading, Bishop was a case about the weight
to be given to a federal court's interpretation of a state statute, not about a employee's due process rights.
'Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
"408 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added).
'"Arnett, 416 U.S. at 152.
[Vol. 18:4
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three-part test established by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.6
A. The Approach of the Arnett Plurality
The plurality in Arnett held that substantive entitlements created by state
statute could be limited by the procedural aspects of the statutory scheme that
created them .6 Language in Arnett supports the contention that the pro-
cedural protections embodied in the Ohio statute challenged in Loudermill not
only satisfy the requirements of due process, but actually define those re-
quirements. Writing for the plurality, Justice Rehnquist stated that, "[an]
employee's statutorily defined right is not a guarantee against removal without
cause in the abstract, but such a guarantee as enforced by the procedures
which [the state] has designated for the determination of cause." 63
The Ohio courts have accepted Justice Rehnquist's reasoning. In Parfitt
v. Columbus Correctional Facility," the Supreme Court of Ohio held that Ar-
nett "made it clear that a pre-termination hearing was not required under the
Due Process Clause to remove [ ] civil service employees."6 That court also
held that Ohio's constitution requires no more than the federal constitution
does.66
Conversely, Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Arnett supports the ar-
gument that something more than mere compliance with state-defined proce-
dures is required by the Constitution. "[Tlhe adequacy of statutory procedures
for deprivation of a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in
constitutional terms."67 Justice Powell stated that the right to procedural due
process is "conferred not by legislative grace, but by constitutional
guarantee."" In other words, although the entitlement itself is statutorily cre-
ated, the procedures required once such an entitlement has been found are
mandated by the Constitution. Constitutional protections are required "to in-
sure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated." 69 Thus, even
though the entitlement to public employment was created by the state, consti-
tutional due process is required to protect that entitlement from possible
abuses.
In addition, our constitutional tradition in general supports the view that
"424 U.S. 319 (1976).
"Amett, 416 U.S. at 152.
"416 U.S. at 152.
"62 Ohio St. 2d 434, 406 N.E.2d 528 (1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1061 (1981).
"62 Ohio St. 2d at 438, 406 N.E.2d at 531.
" l
"Armett, 416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J. concurring).
uid.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
Spring, 1985]
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Arnett should not be followed. That tradition encompasses a bias in favor of
affording individuals a federal, perhaps even constitutional, remedy when in-
dividual rights are violated.7" In Monroe v. Pape,7 the Court stated that a
federal action can proceed despite the existence of a state remedy.72 In other
words, the existence of a state remedy does not preclude a federal court from
granting relief to an injured party. This tradition would support Justice
Powell's view that due process affords public employees constitutional protec-
tion beyond mere compliance with state law.
Recent trends, however, seemed to signal a departure from this tradition.73
In Ingraham v. Wright,74 the Court held that the availability of a state tort
remedy was a conclusive factor in deciding whether a hearing was required
prior to the imposition of corporal punishment on students.3 Since a student
against whom corporal punishment was imposed could sue in tort for damages
if that punishment was excessive, there was no need for an additional federal
remedy.76
Ingraham and Arnett seemed to indicate the Court's disposition regarding
the contours of procedural due process prior to its decision in Loudermill: the
body (a state legislature) that creates an entitlement is the body that decides
how to administer and terminate that entitlement. Thus, if the approach of the
Arnett plurality had been adopted, a state's statutory procedures would almost
always have been held to satisfy the requirements of due process.
However, in the years since it was advanced, Justice Rehnquist's ap-
proach was criticized as an "unjustifiable abdication of judicial
responsibility."77 "By allowing the government not only to determine the ex-
istence of an entitlement but also to prescribe the procedures for its depriva-
tion, the Court would fail to fulfill its important protective function."'
The Arnett Court's failure to establish criteria for deciding what process is
due has been criticized: The Arnett opinions point up the Court's failure to
develop a coherent structure for deciding what specific procedural safeguards
I'See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
71365 U.S. 167 (1961) overruled in part by Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
663 (1978).
"Id. at 183.
"But see Loudermill, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4308 (Recent trends have rejected the Arnett plurity's reasoning, citing
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1984)).
7"430 U.S. 651 (1977).
7Id. at 674-82.
"Id. See also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (prison inmate not entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing
to determine the propriety of the "loss" of his "hobby materials" because such a hearing would be imprac-
tical, and inmate could sue guard in tort).
"rTRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 535 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBEI.
78Id.
[Vol. 18:4
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are mandated in various contexts. A flexible balancing is desirable to allow
consideration of many relevant factors and to encourage the protection of a
wide range of interests.79 The court attempted to formulate just such a balanc-
ing test in Mathews v. Eldridge.s°
B. The Application of the Mathews test
In Mathews, the Court formulated a three-part balancing test to address
the issue of what procedures are required by the constitutional guarantee of
due process:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement would entail."'
The principle necessarily governing the balancing of these factors is that due
process requires that a holder of an entitlement be given procedural protec-
tions "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."82
1. The Individual's Interest
In determining the strength of the individual respondent's interest in be-
ing afforded a pre-termination hearing, it is helpful to compare that interest to
the individuals' interests involved in the relevant precedents. In Bell v.
Burson,3 a pre-Mathews decision, the Court held that a hearing is required
prior to suspension of a driver's license because of the strength of the in-
dividual's interest in such a license.8' A weighing of the Mathews factors has
resulted in the conclusion that pre-termination hearings are also required
before a student is suspended from a public school, 5 and before a prisoner is
transferred to a mental institution," again because of the strength of the in-
dividual's interest in those cases. In Mathews itself, the Court held that social
security disability benefits could be terminated without a full evidentiary hear-
ing because the individual's interest was outweighed by the potential burdens
"Freund, The Supreme Court 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 90 (1974).
-424 U.S. 319 (1976).
1"424 U.S. at 335 (1976).
"Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
"1402 U.S. 535 (1971).
"Id. at 539-41.
'Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975).t6Viteko 445 U.S. at 492-94.
Spring, 19851
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on the government if such a hearing was required." However, in Goldberg v.
Kelly88 the Court held that such a hearing is required before termination of
welfare benefits.89
It can be argued that one's interest in a driver's license carries less weight
than one's interest in continued employment; thus, if a hearing was required in
Bell, the Court properly required one in Loudermill. In the average case, sus-
pension of a driver's license will not have serious financial implications (though
it may result in inconvenience), nor will it result in an injury to one's reputa-
tion. Although temporary suspension from school, as in Goss, may affect one's
reputation, it will not have a financial impact. A prisoner's transfer to a mental
institution, as in Vitek, imposes serious restraints on his liberty and the conse-
quences of such a transfer are at least as serious as those that flow from discon-
tinuance of employment. Thus, these three cases place Loudermill's claim
somewhere in the realm of cases requiring pre-termination hearings.
However, the existence of a financial interest or a restraint on one's liber-
ty are not enough to determine the outcome in cases like Loudermill. In Par-
ratt v. Taylor,90 a prisoner faced economic loss, albeit slight, when his hobby
materials were "lost" by prison guards. The Court held that a pre-deprivation
hearing was not required.9' Harm to one's reputation or dignity is not
dispositive either. In Ingraham, the Court held that a hearing prior to the im-
position of corporal punishment was not required despite the potential harm to
a student's dignity.92
As a comparison of Goldberg with Mathews demonstrates, the Court has
not developed an easily applied hierarchy of interests into which the interest
involved here can be fit.93 Characterization of the relative strength of the
respondent's interest in a case such as Loudermill involves an essentially sub-
jective assessment of the harshness of the consequences which stem from the
termination of that interest.
2. Risk of Error
The second factor to be considered is whether the proposed procedure
would help to minimize the risk of erroneous deprivations of rights. Although
it is undeniably true that the risk of an erroneous discharge from employment
"Mathews 424 U.S. at 349.
U397 U.S. 254 (1970).
"Id. at 266-71.
-451 U.S. 527 (1981).
"I1d. at 541.
92430 U.S. 651 (1977).
"Both Mathews and Goldberg involved the general category of welfare benefits; however, in the former, a
pre-termination hearing was not required, while in the latter, such a hearing was required. See supra notes
87-89 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18:4
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was higher without a pre-termination hearing than with one,9" the inquiry can-
not end there. It is equally true that an erroneous deprivation could be effec-
tively cured by reinstatement and compensation for lost earnings. The ques-
tion is whether minimizing the risk of error is, on balance, worth the cost of a
pre-termination hearing.
In Ingraham, the availability of an effective post-deprivation remedy was
dispositive. 95 Thus, the same should have held true in Loudermill. It is possible
to distinguish Ingraham from Loudermill on the basis that in Ingraham a pre-
termination hearing was not feasibly practical because of the necessarily spon-
taneous nature of the school's action.96 Such is not the case in the area of public
employment, however, where no emergency necessitates immediate action. A
pre-termination hearing would have been feasible in Loudermill's case.
The ease of curing an erroneous deprivation is a factor that weighs against
making the expenditures necessary to eliminate occasional errors. However, it
may be more efficient to avoid those errors initially and eliminate the need for
any correction. Again, the Court itself must assess the value of minimizing the
risk of error as well as the curative value of post-deprivation remedies.
3. The Government's Interest
Under the traditional Mathews analysis, the final factor to be considered
is the strength of the government's interest in affording pre-termination hear-
ings. Here, the dominant consideration is the financial and administrative cost
of affording the proposed procedure. Through a pre-termination hearing would
impose an undue delay on an administrative body, it would be more consistent
with the aims of due process to provide for some form of temporary action
such as suspension pending final action. This would allow the administrator to
act while insuring fairness to employees. Additionally, although a pre-
termination hearing is not any more costly than a post-termination procedure,
since not every discharged employee subsequently challenges his dismissal and
because a pre-termination procedure would encourage such challenges by ex-
tending the term of employment pending the employee's appeal, the allowance
for pre-termination hearings would increase the number of such appeals,
thereby increasing their cost.
These factors must be considered in light of the other two prongs of the
Mathews test. The costs of a pre-termination procedure must be weighed
against the costs of erroneous deprivations to the individual who must bear
those costs. Though the individual respondent's interest in continued employ-
"721 F.2d at 562.
11430 U.S. at 674-82.
"Id. at 674-82.
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ment may be relatively strong, the government's interest coupled with the
availability of post-deprivation remedies mitigates against the strength of that
interest when the test is applied and the factors are weighed.
That test, as fashioned by the Court in Mathews and applied in subse-
quent decisions, has been widely criticized on numerous grounds. First, an ac-
curate balancing of the three criteria "require[s] a technique for measuring the
social value and social cost of government income transfers, but no such
technique exists."97 Secondly, state legislatures have no guidelines for
establishing constitutional procedures because "Itihe great variations in the
test as applied [ 1, unnecessarily complicate the task of legislative draftsman-
ship."98 Finally, as a result of Mathews, courts have the power to fashion
statutory procedures raising the concern that "there is no sound argument that
this is a legitimate power or function of the Court."99 Indeed, Professor Tribe
has argued that:
The proper role of courts in this context is to define and protect those
substantive and procedural rights that may not receive their due respect in
the political process. It is largely this additional protection, after all, that
justifies the judicial review of administrative procedures in the elabora-
tion of constitutional norms.100
Thus, from the traditional liberal perspective of most constitutional scholars,
Mathews provides an inadequate mechanism for deciding what process is due.
However, these same scholars criticize Justice Rehnquist's approach in Arnett
too. 101 Still the following section will argue that the Supreme Court should
have adopted a Rehnquist-like approach in Loudermill for reasons which stem
from a distinctly anti-liberal perspective. 02
III. THE RULE OF THE ARNETT PLURALITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADOPTED
Writing for the plurality in Arnett, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that en-
titlements created by statute can be limited by and conditioned on the pro-
cedural rules accompanying those entitlements. 3 This rule should have been
adopted by the Supreme Court in Loudermill, not necessarily because of its
"Mashaw, The Supreme Court s Due Process Calculus For Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. El.
dridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 48 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Mashaw].
"Freurd, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 90 (1974) (Footnote omitted).
"Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85, 125.
1°°See TRIBE, supra note 77, at 343.
"'See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
"'For this article's critique of liberalism, see Note, Radical Pluralism: A Proposed Theoretical Framework
for the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 72 GEO. L.J. 1143, 1144-45 (1984). This article's arguments in
favor of adopting Justice Rehnquist's approach are anti-liberal in that they are motivated by a desire to
drastically change the nature of the American judicial system, not merely to "fix" the problem that courts
face in procedural due process cases.
"'Arnett, 416 U.S. at 152.
[Vol. 18:4
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wisdom, but because of the effects that such an affirmance would have had
both on litigants and on the general public.'0
The Arnett plurality articulated a clear rule of law; adoption of which
would have had two desirable affects. First, a clear rule of law in this instance
would allow the holders of entitlements to understand the nature and contours
of those entitlements at the time that the entitlement was granted. Second, ex-
posure of the political biases of the Supreme Court would make possible polit-
ical action aimed towards reforming the judicial system. It is because of this
second effect that the Court declined to adopt the plurality rationale in Arnett.
A. The Arnett Plurality's Rule Would Allow Holders of Entitlements to Ap-
preciate the Dimensions of Those Entitlements Without Having to Liti-
gate them.
The Loudermill decision incorporates a Mathews-type approach that dif-
fers from Justice Rehnquist's approach in that it is constitutionally rather than
statutorily-based and thus, on its face, it appears to more directly address con-
cerns about fairness. 5 However, from the point of view of holders of en-
titlements, the Arnett approach is preferable to the Mathews test as applied in
Loudermill in that it creates a clear rule of law.
At first blush, it may seem that the plurality's rule in Arnett is harsher on
holders of entitlements than the Mathews test as applied in Loudermill.
However, the Mathews test does not insure favorable results to holders of en-
titlements;"° all it does insure is that holders of entitlements will have to
litigate the issue of the adequacy of any given procedure. Under Mathews,
there is no way for the holder of an entitlement, or for that matter, the agency
in charge of administering that entitlement, to know whether statutory pro-
cedures will be upheld until their validity has been adjudicated. The Louder-
mill decision, though seemingly clear on its face, will do no more in practice to
protect holders of entitlements than Mathews has done. Although Justice
White's majority opinion stated that the right of public employees to a pre-
termination hearing is constitutionally mandated, 07 he also indicated that the
hearing need not be extensive and does not have to resemble a trial.10°
However, he did not go on to articulate precisely what kind of hearing is re-
10There may be those who object to this article's arguments because of their political nature, and are not based
on an objective analysis of what the "right" rule of law is. Because this article ascribes to the position that
"Itlhe [law'sl pretense is that the law is a system of known rules applied by a judge," LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION
To LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949), and that the Court functions as an essentially political body, see generally
THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys, ed., 1983), objective analysis that attempts to identify any rule as "right"
is an empty exercise in abstraction. Legal analysis should incorporate a realistic appreciation of the way the
judiciary operates.
'See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying test; see also infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
I")n the contrary, in Mathews itself, the Court held that recipients of social security disability payments are
not entitled to a pre-termination hearing. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
'
0TLoudermill, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4308.
"'Id. at 4309; see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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quired. °9 Thus, Loudermill does not go far enough in defining the constitu-
tionally required procedure; holders of entitlements still cannot understand
and fully appreciate the dimensions of those entitlements until those dimen-
sions are defined by a court.
If, as has been argued, substance and process are inextricably
intertwined,"0 the fact that a procedure is untested means that holders of en-
titlements cannot appreciate the substantive right, if any, created by an entitle-
ment. People have come to rely on the benefits derived from modern,
statutorily-created entitlements such as welfare and social security for their
subsistence."' The insecurity one would feel if one had no way of knowing
how long those benefits might be received, or how easily they could be ter-
minated, must certainly be substantial. If the holders of entitlements were
made to understand the scope of those entitlements, they could assess for
themselves the wisdom of relying on the continuation of the benefits that they
receive. Instead of taking away procedurally what had previously been granted
substantively, agencies would grant a substantive right which was, at its incep-
tion, conditioned on and limited by procedural rules.
Incidental to this point are arguments concerned with judicial and ad-
ministrative economy. Instead of piece-meal litigation and appeals or ad-
ministrative decisions questioning the adequacy of a procedure, the constitu-
tionality or wisdom of a substantive entitlement as conditioned on or limited
by accompanying procedures could be questioned and resolved conclusively at
the outset of its application. This would greatly reduce the costs to government
agencies of repeated appeals and litigation challenging administrative decision-
making. Though there could be appeals challenging the merits of particular
decisions, the decision-making process itself could not be challenged further
after its validity had been established judicially."'
119J. White did, however, say that the hearing should be aimed at avoiding mistakes. Id. at 4309. Still, the pre-
cise procedures necessary for accomplishing that end are nowhere defined. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist
stated that the "lack of principled standards in this area means that these procedural due process cases will
recur time and again. Every different set of facts will present a new issue ..." Id. at 4314 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
"'See generally Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 131 (1981). Though Justice White rejected
this reasoning, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4308, this author thinks that he is mistaken. Common sense informs us that
substance and procedure are inevitably two aspects of the same statutory scheme, not two separate schemes
in and of themselves. These two aspects work together to form the work of the statutorily-created entitle-
ment.
"'"The wealth of more and more Americans depends upon a relationship to government. Increasingly,
Americans live on government largess ..." Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
"'An argument can be made that certain kinds of substance-limiting procedures are so tied to the merits that
the merits can only be attacked by attacking the fact-finding process itself. For example, in Bishop, a finding
of cause could be based on the discretion of the police officer's superior. 426 U.S. at 345. In that case, one
might argue that the employee had no way to challenge the exercise of discretion; the procedure required a
finding of cause, cause was found, and that ends the matter. [This author is indebted to Dean Jonathon
Chase for this argument.]
This objection misses the point. If the substantive entitlement is seen as limited by its accompanying pro-
cedure from its inception, the constitutionality of that whole scheme can be tested; if the discretionary
[Vol. 18:4
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The important point here, though, is that it is not fair to encourage
reliance on substantive entitlements only to undercut those same entitlements
after such reliance has been formed. Holders of entitlements should be able to
know exactly on what they are relying at the time that reliance is created. The
Arnett plurality's approach would result in encouraging reliance only to the
extent that it was justified."3
B. The Arnett Plurality's Approach Would Expose the Political Biases of the
Supreme Court, thereby Facilitating Political Action with a View
Towards Changing the Judicial System.
The approach of the Arnett plurality avoids some distasteful aspects of
the approach employed by the Court in Mathews"" and in Loudermill."5
Through Arnett is an example of positivism"16 in its most arbitrary form,
Mathews and Loudermill allow "the patent arbitrariness of positivism... [to
be] pushed below the surface but [to] persist [ I nonetheless.""' 7 In other words,
though Arnett defines rights as being "no more extensive than the procedures
elements of the scheme destroy its usefulness as a truth-finding process, it can be held unconstitutional.
Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). Furthermore, if a statute, with both its substantive and pro-
cedural elements taken together, is upheld as constitutional, wrong decisions under the statute can be
challenged on their merits. An arbitrary or capricious finding of cause may be the proper subject of a Title
XII action or some other suit on the merits, See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual, 103
S.Ct. 2856, 2866-67 (1983) (citing Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962));
Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 690 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1982), but litigation to
determine the validity of the procedure under the due process clause is not necessary to remedy erroneous
outcomes in these cases.
Even if this counter-argument is wrong, and if an injured party has no remedy for a due process violation
when the procedure is provided by the statute that created a property right is followed, the main argument
here would not fail. That is, such a harsh rule would serve to stimulate opposition, thereby providing an op-
portunity for changing the nature of the judicial process. See infra notes 114-135 and accompanying text.
"'One could argue that "justifiable reliance" point differently, by drawing an analogy to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. UCC § 2-316 allows warranties to be disclaimed; however, UCC § 2-719(3) says that any at-
tempt to limit liability for injury is prima facie unconscionable. Based on that model, one could argue that it
is permissible for a state to refuse to create a property right, but that once such a right is created, attempts to
limit it are unconscionable. [The author is indebted to Dean Jonathon Chase for this argument.]
Again, though, this argument misses the point. So long as holders of entitlements know what the limits of
those entitlements are at the time that it is granted to them, they can justifiably rely on the entitlement as
limited. It is only when holders of entitlements have no way of knowing what the procedural limits on their
substantive entitlement are until after they have been deprived of their property and have been forced to
litigate the issue of validity of the procedure, as is the case if Mathews controls, that they are encouraged to
rely when that reliance might not be justified. The Uniform Commercial Code suggests that fairness dictates
that one should not be able to give with one hand and take away with the other. UCC § 2-719(2). However,
that is not the consequence of this article's position. Under the Arnett plurality's reasoning, it is not the case
that a right is created and then limited by procedure; on the contrary, the right that is created is the right as
limited from its inception.
"'See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
"'See supra notes 30-56 and accompanying text.
"1In philosophy, ethical positivism is an attempt to make ethics an exact science. N. Abbagnauno,
"Positivism," in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 19 (P. Edwards, ed. 1967). In law, the word
"positivism" usually refers to Austinian legal positivism, or the notion that the law consists of the rules made
by a sovereign. F.L. WINDOLPH, LEVIATHAN AND NATURAL LAw 80 (1951).
'rushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411, 424 (1981).
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provided in state law for taking them away,""' the "fuzziness of the [Mathews
and Loudermill] criteria provide an opportunity for manipulation,"" 9 thus
allowing courts to reach the same result as they would under Arnett while
serving to reinforce the legitimation of the dominant societal moral position'2°
in a subtle, disguised way.
In delineating the various roles of law, Mark Tushnet has said that, in its
ideological role, the law operates to do three things: first, it justifies the domi-
nance of the dominators; 2' second, it reconciles the oppressed with the system
.that oppresses them; "'2 and, third, it helps to maintain the status quo by serving
as a barrier to organization of opposition.' The Mathews approach as applied
in Loudermill is a worse offender than the approach of the Arnett plurality
with respect to all three of these functions of law simply because the former ap-
proach allows judges to couch their offenses to justice in inoffensive terms.2 4
First. "the legal order helps to persuade the dominated elements in
American society that their domination is justified - or that their material
conditions of existence are justified or, equivalently, that they are not
dominated at all."'2 The Arnett plurality approach is a blatant example of this
kind of attempt to silence the cries of litigants by shifting the "blame" for their
oppression from the courts onto legislatures.' However, the Mathews ap-
proach as applied in Loudermill does even more to silence those cries by not
merely shifting the blame for oppression, but by. justifying that oppression out
of existence. Mathews and Loudermill embody a constitutional standard;2 '
when a procedure passes muster under Loudermill or Mathews, that procedure
is constitutional, and, thus, not oppressive." 8 The highest civil authority that
we recognize, the Constitution, is made to justify judicial decisions under
Loudermill and Mathews, thereby legitimizing the dominators' positions.2 9
"Id. at 423.
"'Tushnet, Truth, Justice, & The American Way, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1979).
"'Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1051-52 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Freeman].
'Tushnet, Perspectives on the Development ofAmerican Law:A Critical Review of Friedman's "A History
of American Law, " 1977 Wis. L. REV. 81, 100 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Tushnet, Perspectives].
"'id. at 94.
'"Id. at 101, 102.
14"Acts that alleviate the immediate problem may, by reducing political pressure, delay the rectification of
other, perhaps greater injustices." Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 694, 708 (1980).
"'See supra Tush( , Perspectives note 121, at 100.
"'Just as an unliberated mother ,n ght shift her child's anger toward her to her husband - "Why? Because
your father said so!" -- Arnett aliows judges to say to litigants: "Why? Because the legislature said so!"
127424 U.S. at 334; 53 U.S.L.W. a, 4308.
1"[Tlhe legal order helps the oppressors understand their actions as those of humane and reasonable people,
by placing what they do in the comprehensive setting derived from a long tradition of ethical reasoning."
Tushnet, Perspectives supra note 121 at 94.
"'[Supreme Court] opinions not only reflect dominant societal moral positions, but also serve as part of the
process of forming or crystallizing such positions." Freeman, supra note 120 at 1051 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 18:4
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However, "[tihe doctrine cannot legitimize unless it is convincing, but it
cannot be convincing... unless it holds out a promise of liberation."'3 ° By tell-
ing the oppressed that their claims will be assessed according to constitutional
ideals, Loudermill and Mathews allow the oppressed to believe that their best
interests have been considered, and that they could and would win if their
claims were meritorious. 3' Litigants are told that they are being afforded "due
process," and that the outcomes in cases decided according to Loudermill and
Mathews are fundamentally fair.' The approach of the Arnett plurality does
not purport to show sensitivity to the litigant's plight; it merely holds that state
legislatures are competent to decide what process is due, not based on fairness,
but based on their own administrative concerns."' Thus, not only does the
Mathews approach as applied in Loudermill justify the dominance of the
dominators, but it also reconciles the oppressed with their oppression in a
much more effective way than the Arnett plurality's approach would.
Finally, Loudermill and Mathews "affect[ I social stability by combining
with other factors to inhibit social change."'34 By "softening the blows" of
courts' decisions, by reconciling the oppressed and justifying the dominators'
dominance, the status quo is reinforced and challenges to the existing regime
are defused. By characterizing decisions as "constitutional," and thus "fair,"
the Mathews approach as applied in Loudermill "serves as an additional bar-
rier to organization of the underdogs to upset existing social arrangements.' ' 35
The harshness and blatant positivism of the approach of the Arnett plurality
would stimulate opposition. For this reason, the Court did not employ this ap-
proach in Loudermill.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysi demonstrates that the Mathews approach as ap-
plied in Loudermill does mbre to appease those who might wish to disturb the
existing structure of society than the approach of the Arnett plurality would.'36
'"Freeman, supra note 120, at 1052.
""'For all that appears, the Justice simply retreated to their chambers and pondered over what would be
best, and emerged with conclusions that cannot be criticized except by saying that the critic, were it up to
him, would have arrived at a different balance." Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival
of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 261, 285 (footnote omitted).
"'"[Decisions like Goldberg and Mathews deflect political forces] into a fruitless struggle against a
bureaucracy that readily swallowed the Court-prescribed dose of due process without any change in symp-
toms, and second by bolstering the idea that fairness was not far away in the American welfare state."
Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, supra note 124, at 709.
"'John Ely has argued that these kinds of issues ought to be decided by the political process. Those who wish
to challenge the decisions of Legislatures should do so by exercising their political power, not by seeking
redress in the courts. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 (1980). This argument has been attacked
on various grounds. See. e.g., Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely
to Constitutional Theory, 89 Yale L.J. 1037 (1980).
"'Tushnet, Perspectives, supra note 121, at 101.
"'id. at 102.
"See supra notes 74-103 and accompanying text.
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It further argues that courts can reach the same results (adverse to individual
litigants') by following either approach."' Thus, it is no surprise that the
Supreme Court used a Mathews-like approach in holding that the post-
termination procedure afforded by the Ohio statute' is unconstitutional. The
choice of this approach was predictable if one considered the Court's tendency
to avoid politically "hot" issues.' By "focusing on technique rather than on
questions of value [the Mathews and Loudermill cases) generate[ ] an inquiry
that is incomplete because unresponsive to the full range of concerns embodied
in the due process clause,"' as well as in the hearts and minds of the people.
However, those approaches cloud their unresponsiveness with images of con-
stitutionalism and fairness,'" and thereby deflect any would-be opposition.'
The approach of the Arnett plurality is no less unresponsive; however, its
harshness and blatancy make opposition to it more viable.4 In an extension of
its attempts to deflect political opposition, the Supreme Court has chosen to ex-
tend a Mathews-like approach as opposed to the approach of the Arnett
plurality in deciding Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.
" See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
"See supra note 11.
"'This point has been discussed in relation to issues such as the political question doctrine and standing.
Charles Black has argued that it's not just that the cases are "hot," but that they're difficult. C. BLACK,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). The Court, for example, might not want
to endorse a policy that says that the states can provide any procedure they want. The Mathews approach
would allow courts to hear § 1983 cases concerning job termination while allowing them to avoid prescrib-
ing the precise procedures required by the Constitution, thus still leaving the matter in the hands of state
legislatures.
"'Mashaw, supra, note 97, at 28.
" See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
"'See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
"'See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
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